Why do some military occupations succeed and others fail? With the U.S. occupation in Iraq continuing to make headlines, this critical question is the focus of a new book by Georgetown University Assistant Professor
David M. Edelstein. In the book,
Occupational Hazards: Successes and Failure in Military Occupation (Cornell University Press, 2008), Edelstein analyzes the occasional successes of military occupations and their more frequent failures. He identifies twenty-six cases since 1815 in which an outside power seized control of a territory where the occupying party had no long-term claim on sovereignty. In a book that has implications for present-day policy, he draws evidence from such historical cases as well as from four current occupations—Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq—where the outcome is not yet known.
“Not only do we need to ask how occupations can be conducted better, but more fundamentally, we need to ask whether the project of social, political, and economic reconstruction that is often incumbent on military occupiers is a task that should be welcomed,” Edelstein writes.
Conducting qualitative case studies, Edelstein evaluates how threat environment, strategies of occupation and occupation outcomes interact. He examines the different reasons countries decide to end occupations, and considers alternative arguments about the consequences of multilateralism in contemporary military occupation. He also presents preliminary evidence from two ongoing cases of occupation – Iraq and Afghanistan – and concludes that military occupation is “among the most difficult tasks of statecraft.”
Occupation is difficult, in Edelstein's view, because ambitious goals require considerable time and resources, yet both the occupied population and the occupying power want occupation to end quickly and inexpensively; in drawn-out occupations, impatience grows and resources dwindle. This combination sabotages the occupying power's ability to accomplish two tasks: convince an occupied population to suppress its nationalist desires and sustain its own commitment to the occupation. Structural conditions and strategic choices play crucial roles in the success or failure of an occupation. In describing those factors, Edelstein prescribes a course of action for the future.
“If only we had had this book before the invasion of Iraq!” says Jack Snyder, Robert and Renée Belfer Professor of International Relations, Columbia University. “David Edelstein lucidly and compellingly explains why successful military occupations have been so rare in history and what conditions are needed for them to succeed.”
In addition to teaching an introductory course on international relations this semester,
Edelstein is teaching a unique course entitled “Causes of War,” that utilizes high definition video technology to connect students at Georgetown’s Washington, D.C. and Doha, Qatar campuses. Students seven thousand miles apart participate in a simultaneous discussion covering the various theoretical arguments that have been advanced about the causes of both international and civil wars. They also discuss whether wars can be started justly and how wars end.
David M. Edelstein is assistant professor in the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service and the Department of Government at Georgetown University. In addition, he is a core faculty member in Georgetown's Security Studies Program and Center for Peace and Security Studies. He received his Ph.D. and M.A. in Political Science from the University of Chicago and his B.A. from Colgate University. His research and teaching focus on international security, international relations theory, and U.S. foreign policy. Prior to arriving at Georgetown, he was a pre-doctoral fellow at Stanford University's Center for International Security and Cooperation and a post-doctoral fellow at Harvard University's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. In addition, his research has been published in International Security, Security Studies, and Survival. His current research focuses on exit strategies from military intervention.
